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Summary findings
Hammer and Jack examine the design and limitations of  *  The impact of local competition on the desirable
incentives for health care providers to serve in rural areas  level of training for new doctors.
in developing countries. Governments face two  *  The incentive power that can be reasonably
problems: it is costly to compensate well-trained urban  expected from explicit contracts.
physicians enough to relocate to rural areas, and it is  One problem a government faces is choosing how
difficult to ensure quality care when monitoring  much training to give physicians it wants to send to rural
performance is costly or impossible.  areas. Training is costly, and a physician relocated to the
The goal of providing universal primary health care  countryside is outside the government's  direct control.
has been hard to meet, in part because of the difficulty of  Should rural doctors  face a ceiling on the prices they
staffing rural medical posts with conscientious caregivers.  charge patients? Can it be enforced?
The problem is providing physicians with incentives at a  Hammer and Jack discuss factors to consider in
reasonable cost. Governments are often unable to  determining how to pay rural medical workers but
purchase medical services of adequate quality even from  conclude that we might have to set realistic bounds on
civil servants.  our expectations about delivering certain kinds of
Using simple microeconomic models of contracts and  services. If we can identify reasons why the best that can
competition, Hammer and Jack examine questions  be expected is not particularly good, it might lead us to
about:  explore entirely different policy systems. Maybe it is too
T  The design of rural service requirements and options  hard to run certain decentralized systems. Maybe we
for newly trained physicians.  should focus on less ambitious but more readily
achievable goals, such as providing basic infrastructure.
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The purpose of this paper is to examine  the problem of ensuring  health-care  coverage  of
rural and poor areas of developing  countries.  We focus  primarily  on the incentives  facing
medical service  providers and analyze  them in light of recent developments  in contract
theory. The approach  is essentially  theoretic  but is motivated  by experiences  in several
countries  in Asia, Eastern  Europe  and Southern  Africa.
Since 1977 the international  health community  has put a great deal of emphasis  on
ensuring  universal  access to basic primary  care as a high priority for public action.  While
the rationale for this emphasis  is questionable, 1 we take this goal as given. In practice,
attempts  to accomplish  this goal have often been  disappointing.  Reliance  on the private
sector to put trained professionals  in such areas is not warranted as demand for the
services at the true opportunity  cost of the professional's  time is simply  too low. State
intervention  is obviously  needed.  On the other  hand,  public performance  has met with, at
best, variable success. Disappointment  stems from several sources but  a  common
problem is the inability to staff and supply medical posts in rural areas. High rates of
absenteeism  (blatant or couched in terms of attending meetings, etc.), high rates of
vacancies  for postings,  simple lack of conscientious  or courteous  care and frequent lack
of supplies  such  as essential  drugs are common  in many  public  facilities.
Why is it so hard to run public  clinics?  We usually  assume in the analysis  of public
expenditures  that if the government  wants a particular  product or service,  it simply  pays
for it and the product appears.  We can debate whether  these services  are appropriate,  but
there is no ambiguity  as to what is, in fact, purchased. 2 Here, however, we seem to face
an essential inability  to purchase a particular  service at all. Apparently  it is difficult to
purchase  medical services of agreed quality (including  due diligence  of effort, sufficient
attendance,  etc.) even from civil servants.
These problems with public provision do  not  necessarily argue in  favor of
abandoning  the goals of basic health care coverage  for the poor but they do highlight the
fact that the costs of provision could be much higher than anticipated.  The underlying
problem  is one of providing  physicians  with incentives  at reasonable  cost. The rest of the
paper examines a number of theoretic models that attempt to  solve aspects of this
problem.  For most of the paper we will use the principal-agent  framework  in which the
government  (principal)  provides incentives  to an agent (physician)  through an explicit
contractual  arrangement,  the terms of which will depend  on, inter alia, the observability
of actions  and outcomes.  We will be particularly  interested  in the role of "high powered"
See Filmer et al. for a critique of this approach to health care policy.
2 This is the essence of cost/benefit analysis or project evaluation - quantities are usually assumed to be a
technological given while inteUectual attention focussed entirely on their valuation.
Iincentives and their limitations.  Some comments  on the provision  of incentives when
contracts cannot be written or enforced conclude the paper.
As a point of departure, let us assume that the government can actually see  and
contract for  all relevant dimensions of health care. In this  case, there  is no incentive
problem per se as it is possible to ensure that the wage at which the universality objective
is met will yield the expected services. The problem is that this level of wages may be
very high - much higher than is likely to be forthcoming in any practical  sense. One
reason is the existence of greater earnings opportunities in richer, more urban areas of the
country. On top of this, of course, is the fact that medical personnel are generally much
better educated and potentially have higher incomes than the country average and tend to
want the amenities that go along with urban life. If they have families they will tend to
want to give their children  educational opportunities usually found in cities. A recent
survey of medical personnel in Indonesia discovered that the amount of money necessary
to get them to relocate to the more remote areas of the country (generally away  from
Java) was several multiples of actual wages. 3 At first glance, there does not appear to be a
problem of ineffective incentives, but one of insufficient budget. There could well be
good,  economic,  reasons  for  insufficient  funds.  If  taxes  to  pay  for  government
expenditures  are  distortionary,  and  most  tax  systems  in  poor  countries  are  very
distortionary indeed, then there is an additional social cost of meeting the universality
objective. This gives a good reason to see if there is a way to reduce the overall cost of
provision by exploiti  ag the design of contracts to doctors (see section 2).
At the other extreme. we  can assume that the government can observe  nothing
about physician performance - that is, it can't  tell if there is a doctor in attendance in a
village at all much less if  she is charging (illegally  if  a public  facility) or providing
conscientious care. This is something of a straw man but  does raise one point. In this
case, a  publicly  employed  doctor is  indistinguishable  from a  completely  unregulated
private doctor (except that the public employee costs the government more). Except in
idiosyncratic cases (such as a dedicated altruist or a doctor wanting to live in her home
village regardless of income) there is no reason to believe any of the poor areas will be
covered. Not only will it be costly to induce urban doctors to move (the constraint of the
preceding paragraph), but without performance incentives the real cost of services will
escalate dramatically.  One is then  left to wonder where, given the inherently high cost,
the desirability of universal provision comes from.
Intermediate within these extremes are cases in which some sort of information is
available or can be obtained at some cost, say by improved monitoring. In such cases we
will look at the tradeoff between improving performance with incentives and controlling
costs imposed by different information structures. Of course, incentives can be provided
3 Chomitz  et al. (1998).  Interestingly,  they did find  that promises  of placement  in graduate  education  would
induce  doctors  to relocate.  However,  this seems  to depend  on a highly distorted,  non-transparent  system  of
graduate  admissions,  leverage  that  would  disappear  should  medical  education  be reformed.
2by people other than government bureaucrats such as competing providers  (traditional
healers), consumers themselves (through complaints or willingness to pay additional fees
- whether legal or not) and future employers (through reputation development or career
concerns of the doctor).
In  the  next  section we  abstract  from  performance incentives  and  consider  the
optimal  policy  that  induces  physicians  to  practice  in  rural  areas,  recognizing  that
opportunity costs differ across providers.  Section 3 considers the role of competitors and
consumers in providing performance incentives for rural doctors, and the implications for
training  policies.  Section 4  reviews  the  lessons that  can be  learned  from  standard
contract theory when explicit incentives can be provided, and section 5 concludes.
2. Satisfying the Participation Constraint: Getting Doctors to  Serve in Rural
Areas
This section examines how a government might pay physicians to serve rural areas
when (i) there are fixed costs associated with relocation (including amenity costs), and
(ii) some physicians are more willing to move than others. Physicians clearly need to be
compensated for the costs of moving, so by itself, the fixed cost component does not add
anything of much interest to this question. But when medical care providers differ in their
willingness to relocate - for example, due to  differences in underlying preferences  or
opportunity costs - the treatment of fixed costs can be used to minimize total financial
costs incurred by the government.  (We assume in this section that there is no monitoring
problem once physicians have relocated to rural areas.)
We measure the quantity of services delivered by a physician by a variable q - this
could be the number of years she is resident in a rural community, or equivalently the
number of (potential) patients to whom she provides services. The government attaches
some welfare value to the delivery of services, and for simplicity, we shall assume this is
constant at the margin. That is, the social value of q is just bq, for some b > 0. This can be
motivated  by  an  assumption that  the under-supply  of  rural  physicians  is  very  large
relative to the availability of new graduates (so that decreasing returns are yet to set in).
Physicians incur a fixed cost R when they relocate, and an increasing and convex
variable cost c(q) once in a rural community. If t is the total monetary payment made to
the physician, then her net utility is when providing q is simply
u(t,q) = t-[R+c(q)].
We shall assume for now that the fixed cost of relocation, R, is common to all physicians,
but that they may differ in the variable cost component. For concreteness, let us assume
that
c(q) = Oq212
3and that physicians vary in their values of 9. In particular, a proportion 0  of the available
physician pool has cost parameter OL, and a proportion (I- 5) has cost parameter  OH.
The government's objective is to maximize the social benefit of medical care less
the financial costs of delivery  (i.e., the costs  of paying physicians). 4 If both  types  of
physician are fully employed, welfare is
W =  (bqL  - tL)  + (l -)(bqH  - tH)
where qi is the quantity of services provided by a physician of type i. Note that we do not
include  the  utility  of  the  physicians  in  this  measure  of  welfare,  motivated  by  the
assumption that public income is more valuable than (private) physician income due to
the existence of tax distortions. The welfare of physicians is important however, as their
pursuit of it generates incentive effects.
Pricing policies
If the government paid a constant rate b per service (e.g., b could be the annual
salary), then services would be provided up to the point at which the marginal cost to the
physician matched the marginal social benefit. But social welfare would be very low, W=
0. A  large surplus is  generated by  this  uniform pricing policy,  but  since the  surplus
accrues  to  physicians,  whose  welfare  receives  no  weight  in  social  welfare,  the
government can potentially improve on matters. 5
With a single type of physician, with cost parameter 9, the optimal pricing policy is
to pay physicians the uniform marginal price b and to charge them  an amount S(b) =
b2/2 0, less the relocation costs R, to enter the rural health service. S(b) is the gross surplus
earned by a physician of type 9 earning b per unit of service provision: i.e.,
S(b) = max bq - q212  = b2/2  0.
In the event that the surplus is smaller than the relocation cost, the fixed payment would
be a transfer from the government to the physician, but would not be large enough to
cover the whole relocation cost.
When there  are two  physician  types,  then  different  fixed  fees  would  be  paid,
denoted SL(b) and SH(b),  but the same marginal compensation rate employed. When such
perfect discrimination is not possible, an optimal two part tarif  will trade off some social
4 Without  loss of generality,  the costs  of drugs and  other  complementary  inputs  are ignored.
' This  is of course,  completely  isomorphic  with a model  of a monopolist  charging  marginal  cost (and  hence
eaming  zero profits).
4benefits of expanded delivery against the financial savings embodied in a(n algebraically)
higher fixed payment (paid by the physician). 6
Let us assume briefly that R - 0. Then for any marginal price p per unit paid to the
physician, the gross surplus earned by the L types is SL(p) = p2 /2 OL which is greater than
the gross surplus earned by the H types, SH(P) = p 212  OH,  so the largest  fixed fee tne
government could charge is SH(p).  Independent of the fixed fee, conditional on relocating,
physicians of type  OL choose qL =  plOL, and those of type  OH  choose  qH  =  P/OH.  Thus
social welfare is
W = /b[bqL  - (SH(P)  +pqL)]  + (1- ¢5)[bqH  - (SH(P)  + Pq'H)]
(b  p)  (  i-)  +P2
(b-p)p  pI
0  20H
where  0 defined by 1  a=0  ;/OL  + (  - 0) /  OH  is the harmonic mean.
Straightforward  differentiation  yields  the  optimal  marginal  price  (e.g.,  annual
salary)
p  = b/[2  - O'/SH]
and optimal fixed fee
F* =p  /2fH.
If R < F,  physicians have their relocation costs paid and are given a lump-sum "signing
bonus" equal to  F* - R.
The two part tariff is a first step towards a fully non-linear incentive contract. In the
simple case modeled here, with only two types of physician, such a non-linear schedule
reduces to a mechanism that offers providers the option of serving in rural areas for a
short stint or doing so for an extended period, with compensating payments. Formally,
the government offers the alternative quantity-payment pairs, or rural service options,
(qL,tL)  and  (qH,tH)  to  maximize  social  welfare.  This  optimization  is  subject  to  two
constraints: first that all physicians are willing to work (individual rationality, this will be
relaxed  shortly),  and  second  that they  sort themselves  between  the  two  alternatives
(incentive compatibility). That is,
6 See also Tirole (page 145, 1988) for a model of two part tariff pricing by a monopolist.
StL  -CL  (qL)  )0
tff  CH  (qs  H) 2  0
and
tL - CL  (q L)  2 tH  CL (qH  )
tH  - Cq(qH)  2 tL-  cH(qL)
Straightforward arguments can be used to show that only the second and third of these
four constraints bind, allowing the payment amounts to be solved for and substituted into
the welfare function, leading to
W  [bL-  (CL (qL)  +  [CH  (qH)  - CL (qH)])]  + (1-  -[bq-CH  (qH)]
The government's problem is then to maximize Wby choice of qL and qH. The first
order conditions are simply
cL'(qL) = b
and
CH'(qH)  =b+  1  0[CL±(qH)  cH (qH)]
The associated transfers are tL =  cL(qL)  + [cL(qH)  - cH(qH)]  and tH=  C(qH).
Thus  the  solution  is  characterized  by  physicians  with  low  opportunity  costs
providing the efficient level of rural service (cL'(q) = b) while earning a positive rent,
although this rent is lower than under the uniform pricing policy above. Physicians with
higher opportunity costs serve less than the efficient time in rural areas (cH'(q)  >  b), but
earn no rent.  Indeed, if the costs of H-types are too high the government will be forced to
rely solely on L-types to provide rural services, it being too costly to induce even a low
level of participation by the others, making universal provision all but impossible.
3. Equilibrium Behavior  of Unmonitored  City Doctors in Rural Communities
The  previous  section  examined  the  amounts  that  would  need  to  be  paid  to
physicians to get them to move to rural areas.  This  section takes a first look at their
6performance, and thus increases the social value of a well-trained physician. (A well-
trained physician with no incentives is, to a first approximation, no more valuable than a
poorly trained one.)  On the other hand, higher quality local supply, while providing
stronger incentives, reduces the need for high quality externally provided services, so the
impact of local quality on training decisions is ambiguous. Similarly, when the quality of
local supply is low, it might be optimal to forsake the provision of (weak) incentives and
to provide external physicians of sufficiently high quality to drive local providers from
the market.
To  formally  model  the  interaction  of  a  traditional  healer  and  a  city-trained
physician, we employ a spatial competition model.  Individuals within a community have
a range of tastes, some preferring to visit a traditional healer, others favoring a physician.
Individuals choose between the two given these tastes, on the basis  of the quality  of
service provided, and the price charged, by each.  To model this we assume individuals
are uniformly distributed along the unit interval [0,1], with the traditional healer located
at 0 and the physician at 1. An individual located at position x gains net surplus w0 = uo -
po - tx by purchasing care from the traditional healer, compared with w 1 = ul -pi  - t(l-x)
by purchasing care from the physician.  ui is the utility of care received from provider i
(which depends on its quality), pi is the price charged by provider i, and t represents the
costs of switching from one provider to the other.  u is an individual's utility from self
care, that is, her outside option.
In this model, the quality of the traditional healer is fixed, and that of the city-
trained doctor is chosen by the government. The unit costs of provision  ci, which  are
constant on the intensive margin (i.e., as quantities vary), are assumed to be higher for
providers of higher quality (say due to better outside opportunities). The providers then
choose the prices at which they sell these services, given that demands respond according
to the behavior of individuals who try to maximize their own well-being (measured by
the  surplus indicators wi above).  In general, higher prices will be  observed when the
costs of  switching provider are large,  and when one provider  enjoys  a larger  quality
advantage vis a vis the other.
When there is no physician, the local healer acts as a monopolist. Given a price po,
all  those  consumers  who  earn a  surplus greater  than  u visit  the healer.  That  is,  all
consumers located to the left of xo' purchase care, where xo' satisfies
UO  -Po -tx = U
or
x0 =(uo -po -u)/t.
7The healer's profit is (po - co)/xo',  which is maximized by setting po = (uo + co - )/2.
Writing s0 = uo - co as the economic surplus generated by the healer, as a monopolist he
covers a share
Y. = (s  - u) / 2t
of the market, if this is less than one, and all of the market otherwise.
Now  suppose the city-trained  physician  enters the rural  community,  effectively
locating at x = 1. Let Y, satisfy the condition
1  - xl  = (s,  - u) / 2t.
Then if  Y, > x 0 , each provider acts as a local monopolist, and there is a segment of the
population, located between these values, that does not seek care from either. Otherwise,
if  Y, < x,  that is, if the average surplus is greater than the total travel costs, (so + sl)12 >
t, the firms engage in price competition. We assume this condition holds for the rest of
this section, so all individuals purchase care.
Given qualities and prices, the position of the indifferent consumer is x,  satisfying
Uo  -po - tx = ut -PI - t(l -x)
or
1  (Au - Ap)
2  2t
where Az = zI -zo.
Given  the qualities of the two  services, market  shares are  determined by  price
competition. The healer solves
max[p0 - c0J
PO
with first order condition
8p0 = 2ti + c,.
Similarly, the physician solves
max[pi  - c, ](1- x)
pi
with first order condition
Pi = 2t(1 - i)  + c.
Jointly these yield equilibrium prices
Po= t +  -(Au  + 2co +cj)
3
and
= t+  (-Au+co  +2c,) Pi  3




of the market, and the physician serves the complement.
Policy Implications
Taking the quality of traditional healers, uo, as given, the government's problem is
to choose how much training to give physicians that it wants to send to the rural area.
Training is costly, and once the physician has located to the countryside, she is outside
the direct control of the govermment. Thus the government assumes that given ul, the
equilibrium prices determined above will be generated by local competition.
9We assume welfare is the sum of local residents' net utility from services less the
cost of training the physician, K(ul). We do not include the utility of the physician or the
local  healer  in  our  measure  of  welfare.  The  government  then  chooses  ul  so  as  to
maximize
W  =;(u"  - Po - tx)dx +  (i(u  - pi - t(l1- x))dx - K(u, )
subject to equilibrium price setting by the providers. Thus the first order condition for the
optimal level of ul given uo is
s'(u,)[a +/Js(u,)] = K'(ul)
where s(ul)  = s1 from above, and cc = 1/2 - f3so,  and P = 1/18t. We assume there is a
unique  solution  to  this  equation  satisfying  the  second  order  condition,  within  the
neighborhood of which the left hand side is decreasing.
Not surprisingly, if the marginal cost of training increases, physicians who are sent
out to rural areas should be less well trained. Also, the higher the net value of the healer's
services, ui - ci, the lower the optimal quality of the city-trained physician.  However, at
low levels of healer quality, an increase in uo should be matched by a reduction in ul, but
for high levels of healer quality, such an increase should be matched by an increase in
physician  quality.  That is, when  existing local capacity is weak,  externally provided
quality should be used as a strategic substitute for local quality, and when local capacity
is strong, it should be employed as a strategic complement.' This result can be interpreted
as indicating that, at low general levels of local capacity, resources should be directed to
those communities especially lacking in health care services, but when average levels are
higher, they should be directed to communities with relatively high existing capacities.
Finally, if training costs are low enough, then it may be socially optimal to provide
sufficiently high quality that the local provider is driven from the market. The city-trained
physician  then  acts  as a  monopolist  with  the power  to  increase  its  price  above  the
duopoly level, without losing customers. While this pricing behavior is not distortionary
from small price increases (since demand is inelastic), it is welfare reducing, due to the
fact that providers' profits receive no weight in the government's objective function. A
price ceiling might then be required (if it can be enforced).
These terms are those introduced by Bulow et al. (1985).
104. Contract  Design with Imperfectly  Observable  Performance
In this section we examine the role of explicit contractual incentives provided by an
imperfectly  informed  government.  In  this  class  of  models,  some  components  of
physician performance can be observed, with an error, and payments can be made based
on  these  signals.  The  question we  are  interested in  answering  is  "How  should  the
payments depend on the signals?"
The essence of the problem is that paying strictly for output, in this case for health
status per se,  exposes a risk-averse provider to too much risk. The government, assumed
to be risk neutral, can provide some implicit insurance by accepting a greater share of
uncertainty, paying somewhat less and having this be to mutual advantage. On the other
hand,  absorbing  all  the  risk  by  paying  only  a  salary  that  is  not  conditional  on
performance blunts  incentives to exert effort (such as not  showing up for work). The
optimal  payment  scheme  is,  as  might  be  expected,  a  combination  of  salary  and
performance payments.
The basic model 8 assumes that  a medical provider produces some  output, x, by
exerting  effort, e,  but  that  the output also  depends on  factors beyond  the provider's
control.  For example, output might be determined by the stochastic relationship x = e + 77
where  q is normally distributed with mean zero and variance v.  Effort is costly to the
physician (or, leisure is valuable) and the marginal cost of working increases according to
the  quadratic  cost  function  C(e)= ce2/2.  The physician's  utility  function  depends  on
money income paid by the principal (here the government) y less effort costs, y-C(e), and
exhibits constant absolute risk-aversion so U(y-C(e)) =  -exp(-r(y-C(e)). 9
If a linear incentive scheme is employed,'" so that y =  k + mx, then the marginal payment
to the agent that maximizes the principal's  expected return is
m = 1/(1+rcv),
with k adjusting to satisfy the agent's participation constraint (i.e., k is large enough to
guarantee that the doctor will accept the contract). We say incentives are high-powered if
m is large (i.e., close to one), and low-powered if it is small (close to zero).
8 This formulation  follows  the notation  used by Dixit (1999),  building  on the seminal  work of Holmstrom
(1979)  and Holnstrom and  Milgrom  (1987,  1991).
9 These specific assumptions can be relaxed without changing the qualitative nature of the results.
'° Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) show that the linear incentive schemes are optimal in a specific class of
moral hazard problems.
11The basic conclusion, from the formula for m, is that explicit incentives are more
high-powered,  i.e.,  are tied more  closely to  observable outcomes, the  lower  the risk
aversion of the physician, the lower the marginal cost of effort and the lower the variance
of  the error  of  observation.  While  overly  simple, the model  gives  one  insight  into
appropriate payment schemes for doctors in public service.  In health care any indicator
of the change in health  status will be  subject to  large variations.  Actual health  status
(however measured) is determined by many factors not in the doctor's  control and any
measure of health status will be plagued by measurement errors itself.  " For a risk averse
doctor, applying the above formula will involve substantial blunting of incentives due to
this uncertainty. Hence, there must be an appreciable wage component, k, independent of
effort and performance in order to induce the doctor to accept the contract at all. High-
powered incentives in real life are usually tied to inputs directly, as in fee for service,
rather than contingent on output. Of course, that introduces its own set of distortions.
Several extensions can be made to overcome some of the unrealistic aspects of the
above model. The first relaxes the assumption of a single "output" of a doctor. Doctors in
public  service  are  called  upon  to  do  many  things,  some  closely  related  to  health
outcomes,  some  less  so.  Besides  providing  curative  care,  public  health  providers
frequently  have  responsibility  for  immunizations,  preventive  health  information
campaigns,  policy  meetings,  clinic  accounting,  inspection  of  water  and  sanitation
facilities,  community  relations  and  so  on.  How  does  the  existence  of  competing
responsibilities affect appropriate payment schemes?
Suppose the principal can make payments respond to each of a number of different
outputs separately. If some of the tasks we ask of the provider are easy to observe (such
as attendance at district staff meetings) while others are quite difficult (such as the degree
of diligence,  or  even just  courtesy,  extended toward  patients),  the  standard  intuition
would suggest providing stronger incentives for the first type, and weaker incentives for
the second. However, the insight provided by formally modeling the multi-dimensional
problem (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) is that this standard intuition is weakened.  If
the two  tasks compete  for the time  of  the provider, some  of  the extra  benefit  from
rewarding the easily observed task comes at the expense of effort for the more difficult to
observe task. Therefore, you will not pay as much for the former.
As Dixit notes, the interactive effect of incentives could show up even if the tasks
have the  same costs  and  variances  in  observation. This  would  arise if  there  were  a
technological link between the two such that they share a common cost function: C(el, e2)
= c.(el2 +2gele2 + e22 } where ei is effort on each of two tasks and g (-1 < g < 1) reflects
the degree of complementarity (g < 0) or substitutability (g > 0) between them. In this
case, the optimal payment is
"  If the report of health status change is given by the doctor herself,  this changes  the game considerably
and places  the problem  in the category  of "costly  state verification".
12y = k + [l/(l+(l+g)rcv)]x(x  I + x2).
The degree to which measured output is rewarded by income depends on whether the two
tasks are complements or substitutes. If substitutes, incentives need to be weakened since
increases  in  one  form  of  effort  detract  from  other  desirable  outputs  as  before.  If
complements, however,  incentives  are  even  sharper  since increases  in  effort  in  one
dimension actually contribute to  other outputs.  This  adds a  further argument  for the
combining of tasks into groups defined by their degree of complementarity. Not only is
there a technological, cost reduction justification" 2 but it also allows for the use of greater
output orientation on the part of the payment scheme.
A second extension recognizes that there may be other relevant "principals" besides
the government employer. Local residents may be able to exert their own influence on the
behavior of the doctor. For example, it has been noted in the Indian states of Kerala and
West Bengal that communities will take matters into their own hands and occasionally
beat up public officials who are seen to be negligent of their duties.' 3 How this behavior
changes the results is, unfortunately, sensitive to the way such sanctions are modeled.
For example, Mirrless (1975) showed that with penalties of unlimited size (getting beaten
up might verge on this), strong incentives can be provided at approximately zero cost. On
the other hand, when infinite penalties are not desirable, local residents can still improve
matters by reducing the information asymmetry at the heart of the incentive problem.  By
threatening to punish inattentive providers they effectively reduce providers' net effort
costs, c.  The principal/government can then adjust the payment mechanism in favor of
higher powered incentives, that is higher m. If punishment by over-zealous local residents
is subject to mistakes, providers  will have to be compensated, effectively with danger
money, that is with a higher base salary.  So, the cost function in the original problem
would be modified by adding a term representing local  sanctions: s(e2/2 +  ) and the
solution replaces c with c-s and increases k to compensate for the variance of 4.  The net
effect would be larger monetary transfers from the state budget, and better performance.
A third extension combines the previous  two.  Suppose there  are two outputs -
attention  to  clinical  services  and  the  execution  of  public  health  activities  such  as
inspections of  sanitary conditions, IEC activities, immunizations  and other preventive
services. Local demands are usually much greater for clinical services and absence from
clinics can be a cause of dissatisfaction on the part of clients whereas inattention to public
health  activities may not be  noticed.  This  situation will require  direct  supplementary
payment for the public health  services or else a separation of responsibilities between
providers so that substitution possibilities do not arise. If demands on the physician are
not paid for  by clients  (i.e., there  are no fees  for clinical  services) the pay  structure
12 See Wilson (1989) for an organizational perspective on the complementarity issue.
3 Caldwell (1986).
13induced by local pressure may require, in addition to direct, high powered pay for public
health services, a higher salary as well since the time used for public health may decrease
satisfaction of the community and cost  the doctor good will (or, in  the case of West
Bengal, safety). Finally we note that the fact that there is active demand for clinical care
but  little or none  for public health is  sometimes cited as one  reason why the  former
should be paid for by the patient and the latter supported by government via its salaried
civil servants. In this example, the inability to charge patients may require both payments
for public health as well as increased salaries, increasing public costs on two counts. Fees
reduce demand and the attendant claims on providers'  time.  This diversion of time is
additional to the diversion of funds between the two activities.' 4
5. Conclusion
This  paper  has  applied  a  selection  of  models  of  incentives,  competition,  and
contracts to various aspects of the problem of supplying medical services in rural areas of
poor countries. This information can be used in two ways. First, it is possible to identify
the scope and, perhaps more importantly, the limitations of the use of direct incentives to
encourage  better  performance.  The  multi-dimensional  nature  of  the  output,  the
opportunity costs facing professionals, the welfare cost of taxation, the wide variety of
information and monitoring structures available to government all have implications for
the  proper  management  of  widely  dispersed  services. Second,  such  models may  set
realistic bounds on our appraisal of delivering certain kinds of services at all. Regardless
of the attractiveness of policy  options on theoretical grounds, recognizing that  public
employees are people who make independent decisions about their careers and lifestyles
can  set  bounds  on  precisely  how  well  government  agencies  can  deliver  promised
services. If we can identify reasons why the best that can be expected is not particularly
good, it may lead us to explore entirely different policy options. Maybe it is too hard to
run certain decentralized systems. Maybe we should focus on less ambitious, but more
readily implementable, goals such as provision of basic infrastructure.
We have not  attempted  to be  comprehensive - the circumstances  of  delivering
services  to  the  poor  in  poor  countries vary  widely.  In  fact,  as  with  the  rest  of  the
literature, there are few robust results on optimal incentives with imperfect information.
Each  circumstance  requires  a  careful  analysis  of  provider  behavior.  General
pronouncements on the best way of delivering services should be treated with  extreme
skepticism. We might recall the words of Lao Tzu: "He who says he knows the way, does
not know the way."
14 Gertler and Hammer  (1997) come to a similar  conclusion  by treating  public health expenditures  as a
residual  payment  in the budget.
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